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HUNTING A DICTATOR AS A 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS:  
THE INTERNALIZATION PROBLEM  
AND THE HISSÈNE HABRÉ CASE 
 
Caleb J. Stevens* 
“So if the question is ‘why do nations obey international law?’, my 
answer would be: Nations obey because of people like us—
lawyers and citizens who care about international law, who 
choose not to leave the law at the water’s edge, who do their 
utmost to ‘bring international law home.’”1  
     -Harold Hongju Koh 
ABSTRACT 
Transnational legal process theory suffers from an 
internalization problem: it does not adequately explain why 
international legal norms are internalized.  This article 
addresses the gap by analyzing the Habré case in Senegal as an 
example of transnational legal process.  Utilizing speech act 
and securitization theories, I argue that internalization can be 
partly explained by three factors of agency: (1) the validity of 
the claim, (2) linguistic competence, and (3) discursive 
strategies.  Positing that the claim in the Habré case is 
sufficiently valid per se, I find multiple actors commanding 
linguistic competence and employing a variety of discursive 
strategies.  I conclude that the agents of internalization have 
been stymied by the linguistic competence and discursive 
                                                          
* B.A., Illinois Wesleyan University; J.D., University of Illinois College of 
Law; MIS, Graduate Institute of International and Development 
Studies/Institut de Hautes Études Internationales et du Développement.  I 
would like to thank Reed Brody and Hélen Boyer of Human Rights Watch 
and Professors Pierre Hazan and Andrea Bianchi for their invaluable 
support, as well as Professor Keith Krause for introducing me to 
securitization theory.  I am also deeply indebted to Messrs. Assane Ndiaye, 
Bachir Fofana, Djibril Aziz Badiane, Aboubacry Mbodj, and others who 
generously gave their time for interviews during my research trip to Senegal 
in 2009. 
1 Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. 
REV. 623, 679–80 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Home]. 
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strategies of counter-agents of internalization, especially 
Senegalese religious leaders. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To write this sentence, this introduction, this article is to 
participate in a transnational process of legal creation and 
compliance.  I am, in a sense, one of the many voices working to 
both ensure state compliance with international law and its 
creation, in this case, through the prosecution of Hissène 
Habré.  As suggested by the above quote, for Koh and other 
transnational legal process theorists, international law is a 
product of a constructivist, dynamic, non-statist, and highly 
participatory process requiring an interdisciplinary approach.2  
                                                          
2 Koh is not alone in articulating an intensely dynamic and non-statist 
theory of international law.  Koh’s cohorts are overwhelmingly associated 
with Yale Law School, an association which caused one scholar to speculate 
on the appropriateness of labeling them a ‘New’ New Haven School.  See 
Laura A. Dickinson, Toward a “New” New Haven School of International 
Law?, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 547, 548–49 (2007).  This inchoate ‘New’ New 
Haven School shares several features with its forbearer, the New Haven 
School: normative commitments to the rule of law and fundamental human 
rights, flexibility with respect to non-state actors, and an empirical and 
interdisciplinary approach to international law.  Id. at 549–51 (“I would like 
to suggest . . . that the work of this younger generation of scholars within the 
orbit of New Haven does, at least, share a number of important features that 
might qualify it as a new school of thought about international law—and 
interestingly, these features echo aspects of the original New Haven 
School.”).  See also Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School 
of International Law?, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 565–71 (2007) [hereinafter 
Koh, New Haven].  For an example of works by possible members of the ‘New’ 
New Haven School, see Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International 
Criminal Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational 
Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2009); Paul Schiff Berman, From International 
Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005); 
Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193 (2005); 
Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the 
New Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393 (2007).  
Thus, the double modifier is a sort of homage to the New Haven School, two 
of whose founding members, Myers McDougal and Harold Laswell, argued 
that any accurate international legal theory requires an understanding of two 
key elements: (1) law as a product of diverse societal, legal, and power 
processes that (2) should move towards a “universal order of human dignity.”  
Myers S. McDougal & Harold D. Laswell, The Identification and Appraisal of 
Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 53 (1959), reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 122 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter 
APPROACHES].  The New Haven School incorporated extra-legal processes of 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6
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Through our collective participation in this process, we give 
international law its normative shape over time.3  Put simply, 
international law is what we make it.  In a recent lecture Koh 
remarked, “[w]e live in an era when anyone with an internet 
connection can participate in international law-making.”4  Koh 
is the great leveler, for international law is no longer the 
exclusive province of governmental actors and treaty 
conferences. Through a transnational legal process framework, 
one sees agents of international law-making and compliance in 
academics writing blogs, Facebook posts by protesters, activists 
in Arab states providing the world with news of their 
governments’ human rights violations, and teams of 
international lawyers roaming the globe looking for states that 
harbor former dictators and international criminals.  It goes 
without saying that this view is not shared by everyone.5   
There are indeed shortcomings to transnational legal 
process theory.   Although Koh has produced a litany of articles 
on transnational legal process,6 his notion of the “vertical 
                                                                                                                                  
society and power influenced by, and in turn influencing, the process of law-
creation. APPROACHES, supra at 110.  They removed the legal positivist 
quarantine between law and politics and reframed international law as a 
dynamic process with a normative end rather than a static object to be 
identified and labeled.  Id. at 110–11.  Transnational legal process theory is 
continuing the New Haven School’s work by allowing more and varied actors 
into international legal theory to help explain state compliance in today’s 
“fourth era” of international law. Harold Hongju Koh, A World Transformed, 
20 YALE J. INT’L L. ix, ix (1995). 
3 See Roda Mushkat, Dissecting International Legal Compliance: An 
Unfinished Odyssey, 38 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 161, 170 (2009).  
4 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dep’t, Address at the 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies: International 
Law in the Obama Administration (Nov. 10, 2009). 
5 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 
132 DAEDALUS 47, 47–48 (2003);  Eric A. Posner, Transnational Legal Process 
and the Supreme Court’s 2003-2004 Term: Some Skeptical Observations, 12 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 23, 25 (2004); Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in 
the “New” Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms 
Created by Domestic Courts, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 455, 456–57 (2007) 
(reiterating concerns over the normative commitments of the New Haven 
School as improperly subordinating law to policy and pointing out that 
transnational legal process also gives rise to these misgivings). 
6 E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 
YALE L.J. 2347 (1991) [hereinafter Koh, Litigation]; Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, 
Process]; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 
YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Nations]; Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
3
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internalization”7 of international law remains incomplete.8   
Specifically, he has not adequately explained why states 
internalize certain international legal norms.9  This article 
addresses the internalization problem by examining a case of 
transnational legal process at work—the efforts by Reed Brody 
of Human Rights Watch, who brandishes the moniker “The 
Dictator Hunter,”10 and others to prosecute former Chadian 
President Hissène Habré in Senegal for torture and other 
international crimes.   What does an examination of efforts to 
hunt the dictator Hissène Habré teach us about transnational 
legal process as a theory of state compliance?  In hazarding an 
answer to this question, I hope to make a not insignificant 
contribution to transnational legal process theory and, by 
extension, the literature on state compliance with international 
law.   
Building on Balzacq’s critique of securitization theory, I 
claim that the internalization of an international legal norm 
can be partly explained by three factors of agency: (1) the 
validity of the claim, (2) the linguistic competence of the agents 
                                                                                                                                  
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975 (2005) 
[hereinafter Koh, Internalization]; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational 
Law Matters, 24 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 745 (2006); Koh, New Haven, supra 
note 2. 
7 As will be explained in more detail, Koh distinguishes between vertical 
and horizontal internalization. See infra Part II(2).  Horizontal internal-
ization is a classical, uncontested concept, whereas vertical internalization 
presents a problem. Therefore, when I refer to an unmodified 
“internalization,” I mean “vertical internalization.” 
8 See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, 
International Relations and Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 544 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002). 
9 Id. Although Koh has illustrated his theory with several examples, 
none of these examples are sufficiently in-depth analyses.  To support his 
theory, Koh has discussed several cases, namely, the campaign to ban 
landmines, the US support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, and the US 
Haitian refugee policy in the early 1990s.  Harold Hongju Koh, Can the 
President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145 (2006) [hereinafter Koh, 
Torturer]; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process after September 
11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 340 (2004) [hereinafter Koh, September]; 
Harold Hongju Koh, Refugees, the Courts, and the New World Order, 1994 
UTAH L. REV. 999, 1013–18 (1994). 
10 This nickname derives from the documentary film eponymously titled, 
“The Dictator Hunter.” CHASSEUR DE DICTATEURS [THE DICTATOR HUNTER] 
(Pierre Hazan Film & Video TV 2001). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6
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of internalization, and (3) their discursive strategies.  Koh’s 
stated aim is for internalization to explain the “micro-processes 
of social influence” that induce states to comply with 
international law.11   By focusing on the elemental factors of 
agency, I hope to reveal a kind of nano-process beneath these 
micro-processes.12  An elucidation of that nano-process can help 
explain the internalization of international legal norms.   
Having said what this article is about, I will now note what 
it is not about.  As Michael Walzer opined, “[t]ell your readers 
what you are not going to do; it will relieve their minds, and 
they will be more inclined to accept what seems a modest 
project.”13  This article does not argue, as a general proposition, 
that transnational legal process theory is superior to other 
compliance theories, even in its explanation of the Habré case.  
Transnational legal process is a powerful theory for explaining 
the Habré case, but I do not contend it is the only one.  Nor 
does it offer a comprehensive application of Balzacq to explain 
vertical internalization. Rather, this article aims to 
demonstrate that transnational legal process is a powerful, 
albeit flawed, theory for explaining the complex realities in 
which international legal compliance occurs and, more 
specifically, for understanding the Habré case.  The flaw lies 
with the internalization component and linking transnational 
legal process theory with part of Balzacq’s critique of 
securitization helps correct for this flaw.  I also suggest that a 
more thorough linkage with Balzacq will prove an even better 
corrective. 
This article is organized as follows.  Part II briefly touches 
on competing explanations for international legal compliance 
and adumbrates transnational legal process theory.  Part III 
lays out the insights provided by speech act and securitization 
theories as well as why and how these theories can improve our 
understanding of internalization in a transnational legal 
                                                          
11 Koh, Internalization, supra note 6, at 977. 
12 For an example of another work that looks to a kind of nano-process 
based on language, see Andrea Bianchi, The Role of Non-State Actors in the 
Globalization of Human Rights: An International Lawyer’s Perspective, in 
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT THE STATE 193–94 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) 
(arguing that human rights are enforced through discursive practices by the 
media that “code” actions as legal or illegal). 
13 MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 8 (1997). 
5
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process.  Part IV demonstrates the soundness of the proposition 
that the Habré case exemplifies transnational legal process at 
work.  Part V is the meat of the article, relying on interviews 
and media reports to support the validity of the claim: 
linguistic competence and discursive strategies can help 
explain efforts to induce Senegal to internalize international 
legal norms in the Habré case.  Part VI concludes with a review 
of the article’s shortcomings and suggests future lines of 
inquiry that may address them. 
II. COMPLIANCE AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 
Writings on international legal compliance are concerned 
with one overriding question: why do nations obey 
international law?  As Louis Henkin put it, “[i]t is probably the 
case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all 
of the time.”14  Compliance theories attempt to explain why this 
is so. 
A.  Why Do States Comply With International Law? 
There are many answers to this question.  Realists argue 
that compliance is merely a coincidence of states’ interests 
being aligned with international law, that international law 
has a negligible influence on state compliance.15  Moore and 
Guzman argue that state compliance with international law 
“signals” information that is not directly observable to other 
states.16  States decide to engage in signaling based on an 
analysis of the costs and benefits associated with signaling 
compliance to other states.17  For Thomas Franck, compliance 
is induced by the pull of a rule’s substantive and procedural 
fairness.18  According to Chayes and Chayes, state compliance 
                                                          
14 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d 
ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted). 
15 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 15, 225 (2005); Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 5; Posner, supra note 5, 
at 25–26. 
16 David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (2003). 
17 Id. at 885–87. 
18 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6
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with treaty regimes, which is their sole focus, results from 
three factors: efficiency, interests, and norms.19  These factors 
operate within a “new sovereignty” state system in which 
states are bound in a tight web of international connections 
and transactions that render them susceptible to persuasion.20   
In a similar vein, transnational network theory addresses 
the increased influence of transnational advocacy networks and 
the concomitant altering of state sovereignty.   Transnational 
network theory posits that human rights norms become 
internalized (Risse and Sikkink prefer the term “socializ[ed]”)21 
in states as a result of transnational advocacy networks 
connecting with domestic actors who provide information on 
state non-compliance with international legal norms.22  Once 
alerted, transnational advocacy networks link up with 
international regimes, pressure the norm-violating state, and 
mobilize international organizations and other states to apply 
pressure as well.23   
Another notable contribution to the compliance debate is 
Goodman and Jinks’ notion of acculturation, defined as “the 
general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and 
behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.”24  According to 
this view, explanations of compliance fixated on coercion or 
persuasion do not adequately account for the complex social 
environment in which social and legal norms are transmitted.25  
The effects of acculturation are observable when actors in the 
target state identify with a particular group and feel cognitive 
and social pressure to conform to that group.26   
                                                                                                                                  
7 (1995). 
19 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 4 (1995). 
20 Id. at 25–26. 
21 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International 
Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 5 (Thomas 
Risse et al. eds., 1999) (the “process by which international norms are 
internalized and implemented domestically can be understood as a process of 
socialization.”) (emphasis in original). 
22 Id. at 3–6, 15–16. 
23 Id. at 3–5, 18–20. 
24 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization 
and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004). 
25 Id. at 625. 
26 Id. at 627. 
7
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Koh argues that acculturation merely marks a midpoint 
between persuasion and coercion and is, therefore, in fact 
incomplete internalization.27 While Goodman and Jinks 
consider acculturation to be distinct from coercion and 
persuasion, Koh views acculturation as one step in an 
“evolutionary process” in which coercion helps bring about 
persuasion and incomplete persuasion is acculturation.28  Once 
persuasion is complete, the norm is fully internalized29 in the 
sense that the state obeys international law because it 
perceives that the norm is part of its “internal value set.”30  
Koh also criticizes Goodman and Jinks for failing to provide a 
detailed explanation of the mechanism by which domestic 
channels influence state compliance.31  Yet, transnational legal 
process theory can be criticized because it too suffers from an 
inability to fully explain how international legal norms are 
internalized.32 
B.  Transnational Legal Process Theory 
Koh defines transnational legal process as “a process 
whereby public and private actors, including nation states, 
corporations, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, and individuals interact in a variety of fora to 
interpret, enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of 
international law.”33 Transnational legal process theory 
describes a “dialectical”34 and dialogic process whereby 
interactions between various private and public actors induce 
state compliance with international law and create 
international law because these repeated interactions 
                                                          
27 Koh, Internalization, supra note 6, at 980. 
28 Id. at 981. 
29 Id. 
30 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 644. 
31 Id. 
32 Moore, supra note 16, at 881. 
33 Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339. 
34 Koh, New Haven, supra note 2, at 569 (citing Paul Schiff Berman, A 
Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 305 (2007)); 
cf. Melissa A. Waters, Dialectical Regulation: The Murky Middle Ground, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 961, 962 (2006) (“Dialectical regulation . . . involves patterns of 
institutional interaction resulting from interdependence among regulatory 
agencies.  This interdependence leads to a significant degree of integration in 
regulatory outputs . . . .”). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6
  
198 PACE INT’L LAW REV. [Vol. XXIV:1 
strengthen and modify international legal norms.35  In turn, 
the international law that emerges impacts future 
noncompliance and, therefore, future interactions.36  Koh refers 
to “agents of internalization” in meaning those individuals, 
international organizations, or governments that provoke these 
interactions and dialogues aimed at inducing state compliance 
with international law.37 
There are four core characteristics of a transnational legal 
process.  The first is nontraditional in that domestic and 
international law are not distinct categories, but blended.38  
The second is non-statist, as both state and non-state actors 
are instrumental players in transnational legal processes.39  
The third is dynamic because it “transforms, mutates, and 
percolates up and down” from the national level to the 
international level.40  The fourth is normative; it creates law by 
inducing states to comply.41  In addition, there are three phases 
within these processes: interaction, interpretation, and 
internalization.42 
It is important to note that Koh does not disavow other 
explanations of state compliance.  He thinks explanations of 
power, interest, legitimacy, and communitarianism have their 
place.43  Rather, his point is these explanations overlook the 
critical importance of transnational legal process in inducing 
state compliance.44   Specifically, these competing explanations 
are not entirely accurate because they fail to adequately 
account for internalization.45   Internalization is the key.  It is 
also the problem. 
The classical view of state compliance focuses on horizontal 
                                                          
35 See Eugene C. Lim, A Long ‘TRIP’ Home: Intellectual Property Rights, 
International Law and the Constructivist Challenge, 4 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 
57, 76 (2008). 
36 Id. 
37 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 646–55. 




42 Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339. 
43 Id. at 338. 
44 Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law 
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1401–06 (1999). 
45 See Koh, Nations, supra note 6, at 2602–03. 
9
  
2012]                      HUNTING A DICTATOR 199 
internalization, but, in Koh’s view, horizontal models must be 
combined with vertical models to provide a complete picture of 
state compliance.46  Horizontal internalization consists of 
treaty conferences, summits, and other similar gatherings 
“where nation-states interact in intergovernmental fora, with 
the main goal of promoting compliance with international 
law.”47  What remains murky is the vertical internalization 
aspect of state compliance.  Vertical internalization occurs 
when agents of internalization, which can be state or non-state 
actors, interact with a violating state in a variety of domestic 
and international fora to induce compliance with international 
law.48  Through full participation in law-creating processes, 
states internalize the norms that are the subject of those 
processes to the point where they become part of the state’s 
“internal value set.”49 This vertical internalization, or 
“domestication,” is the most powerful means of enforcing 
international law, transmogrifying it from external “their” law 
into internal “our” law.  The tools of this transformation are 
well known to lawyers: legislation, executive action, and 
judicial interpretation.50  Senegal has employed all three of 
these tools in the Habré case, yet complete internalization 
remains elusive.   
Thus far I have been imprecise with my terminology.  Koh 
draws a clear distinction between compliance and obedience.  
He defines compliance as occurring when “people are both 
aware of the rule and consciously accept its influence, but do so 
in order to gain specific rewards (e.g., insurance benefits) or to 
avoid specific punishments (e.g., traffic tickets).”51  Obedience 
                                                          
46 Koh, Torturer, supra note 9, at 1146.  For an example of an academic 
in accord with Koh on this point, but who sees even transnational legal 
process and its cousins as insufficient to capture the complex matrix in which 
international law operates, see Berman, supra note 2, at 490 (“An 
interdisciplinary study of these processes of international, transnational, and 
subnational norm development and interpenetration [law and globalization] 
does not, of course, render either traditional international law or the idea of 
nation-state sovereignty irrelevant, but it does complicate the picture 
significantly, prompting the need for a more comprehensive set of inquiries.”). 
47 Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339. 
48 Id. 
49 Harold Hongju Koh, The 2004 Term: Supreme Court Meets 
International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2004). 
50 Id. at 4. 
51 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 628. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6
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“occurs when a person or organization adopts rule-induced 
behavior because the party has internalized the norm and 
incorporated it into its own internal value system.”52  For Koh, 
the goal is not merely compliance, but obedience.  He 
summarizes the relationship between the two as follows: “most 
compliance comes from obedience; most obedience comes from 
norm-internalization; and most norm-internalization comes 
from participation in legal process, particularly transnational 
legal process.”53  In other words, obedience is “internalized 
compliance.”54  Obedience55 could thus be considered a fourth 
phase of transnational legal process proceeding interaction, 
interpretation, and internalization.56 
Finally, there are three forms of internalization: social, 
political, and legal.  Social internalization is “when a norm 
acquires so much public legitimacy that there is widespread 
general adherence to it.”57  Political internalization is when 
“the political elites accept an international norm and advocate 
its adoption as a matter of governmental policy.”58   Legal 
internalization is defined as “when an international norm is 
incorporated into the domestic legal system and becomes 
domestic law through executive action, legislative action, 
judicial interpretation, or some combination of the three.”59  
The transnational legal process of interaction, 
interpretation, internalization (social, political, and legal), and 
obedience may be summarized as follows: 
Normally, one or more transnational actors provokes an 
interaction, or series of interactions, with another in a law-
declaring forum.  This forces an interpretation or enunciation of 
the global norm applicable to the situation.  By so doing, the 
moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to 
force the other party to internalize the new interpretation of the 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339. 
54 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 629. 
55 To clarify, in sections of this article discussing Koh’s transnational 
legal process theory the term “compliance” should be read as synonymous 
with “obedience,” as Koh defines the term. 
56 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 644. 
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international norm into its normative system.  The provoking 
actor’s aim is to ‘bind’ the other party to obey the new 
interpretation as part of its internal value set.  The coerced 
party’s perception that it now has an internal obligation to follow 
the international norm leads it to step four: obedience to the 
newly interpreted norm.60 
As will be explained in more detail below, the above 
description of transnational legal process matches what can be 
observed in the Habré case.  The agents of internalization (the 
“Agents”)61 filed a complaint against the former Chadian 
President, Hissène Habré, who had been residing in Senegal 
since 1990 in contravention of Senegal’s obligation to extradite 
or prosecute him under the UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (“Torture Convention”).62   The Agents used 
multiple judicial fora—Senegalese and Belgian courts, the UN 
Committee against Torture (the “CAT”), and the International 
Court of Justice, and the African Union—in order to spark 
interactions with Senegal and force a particular interpretation 
of universal jurisdiction and the Torture Convention.63  The 
interpretation propounded by the Agents was incorporated into 
Senegal’s legal order via amendments to the Penal Code and 
Constitution.64   In other words, partial norm internalization 
(that is, legal internalization) has occurred. This use of 
multiple judicial fora by lawyers is what Koh refers to as 
“transnational public law litigation,” which is one of the means 
by which transnational legal process operates.65 Unfortunately, 
                                                          
60 Id. at 644. 
61 I use the term Agents as shorthand for agents of internalization.  The 
term encapsulates not only Habré’s victims and human rights NGOs, but all 
actors, including Senegalese governmental actors, seeking to internalize in 
Senegal universal jurisdiction and the obligation to extradite or prosecute.  
The composition of the Agents changes as some groups or individuals, for 
example, participate in Belgian litigation but others do not.  I want to avoid 
getting bogged down in minutia and emphasize the idea that whichever 
individual or group is striving for internalization in Senegal at any given 
moment is acting as an agent of internalization.  If the individuals or 
organizations involved at a given moment are important enough I will 
distinguish them from other Agents. 
62 See infra Part IV. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Koh, Litigation, supra note 6, at 2348. 
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what is lacking in the Habré case is the final step: complete 
norm internalization and, thus, obedience. 
Transnational legal process has been criticized for 
espousing the use of transnational public law litigation, which 
uses the courts to induce state compliance with international 
law.  Waters argues transnational legal process suffers from a 
significant legitimacy problem because of its commitment to 
furthering fundamental human rights through counter-
majoritarian institutions, such as the courts.66   The riposte to 
this argument is that the nature of internalization necessitates 
full acceptance of the norm: socially, politically, and legally.67  
Obedience, as opposed to compliance, by definition, requires a 
norm to become part of the internal value set of society and its 
policymakers.68  Transnational legal process is successful only 
if the internalized international legal norm possesses a broad 
base of support outside the courtroom. 
Keohane also criticizes Koh for failing to explain the liberal 
democracy bias in favor of internalization.  Koh disregards 
regime-type as a factor influencing internalization.69  He 
prefers to explain internalization as a function of the type of 
international legal norm being internalized (e.g. human rights 
versus banking standards).70  In contrast, Keohane argues 
liberal states are more likely to internalize international legal 
norms.71  He identifies four factors that likely contribute to a 
successful internalization: (1) transparency of state practice, (2) 
connections among professionals (e.g., judges), (3) connections 
between social movements and issue-advocacy networks, and 
(4) elite accountability to the public.72  According to Keohane, 
by excluding regime type from his analysis, Koh only begins to 
describe the internalization of international legal norms.73  In 
                                                          
66 Waters, supra note 5, at 458. 
67 See Chander, supra note 2.  
68 Id. 
69 Koh, Home, supra note 1, at 674. 
70 Id. at 674–75. 
71 Robert Keohane, When Does International Law Come Home?, 35 HOUS. 
L. REV. 699, 710–11 (1998). 
72 Id. 
73 Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission 
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my view, Keohane and Koh’s efforts may be misdirected.  Rules 
and regimes are possible proximate causes of internalization, 
but perhaps not the ultimate causes.  The question should not 
focus on norm-type or regimes, but on agency, audience, and 
context. 
The most incisive criticism to date of transnational legal 
process theory comes from Raustiala and Slaughter.  They 
argue that Koh has described internalization as both a 
definition of compliance and its cause.74  Internalization cannot 
be both dependent and independent variables.  It cannot be 
cause and effect.  Consequently, “rather than explaining why 
and when states follow international rules, Koh instead 
describes an empirical pathway to obedience—or, more 
precisely, a pathway to norm incorporation into domestic law—
and details the ways in which transnational actors and 
practices influence this process.”75  To remedy this problem, I 
want to probe deeper than an explanation centered solely on 
internalization will allow.  By focusing on the elemental factors 
of agency, we can better understand the variables influencing 
internalization and begin to separate the causes of 
internalization from the definition of compliance. 
Raustiala and Slaughter have also pointed out that 
transnational legal process theory suffers from a lack of 
analyses across cases.76  As a result, they claim, “Koh cannot 
say when non-compliance should occur or what the optimal 
response should be.”77  Indeed, one of the criticisms of “first 
generation” compliance theorists is that they have not provided 
adequate empirical evidence of the mechanisms by which 
states are induced to comply with international law.78  What 
follows is an attempt to inch toward a “second generation” 
approach whereby arguments concerning the mechanics of 
                                                          
74 Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 544. 
75 Id.; see also Asher Alkoby, Theories of Compliance with International 
Law and the Challenge of Cultural Difference, 4 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 151, 
187 (2008) (“[Koh] describes political and legal interactions leading to 
internalization in fairly mechanistic terms . . . at the endpoint the norm 
somehow acquired its ‘stickiness’ and states complied with it because it had 
been internalized.  How this leap takes place . . . is not clear.”). 
76 Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 544. 
77 Id. 
78 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 24, at 624. 
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inducing state compliance are empirically supported.79  The 
interviews and media sources relied upon provide strong 
empirical support for my argument, demonstrating that the 
three factors of agency can aid our understanding of the 
internalization of international legal norms. An in-depth 
examination of a single case may elucidate some of the 
variables influencing internalization and thus offer insights for 
more ambitious comparative studies. 
III. SPEECH ACTS AND SECURITIZATION THEORY 
Before delving into speech acts and securitization theory, 
an important question must be answered: why attempt to 
explain transnational legal process with a seemingly far 
removed securitization theory and an even further removed 
linguistic theory on speech acts?80  The short answer is 
constructivism.  Constructivism, broadly understood, is the 
intellectual heritage shared by securitization and transnational 
legal process theories.   Transnational legal process theory is 
partly a product of discourses between international law and 
international relations, specifically, its constructivist branch.81  
By arguing that agents of internalization can induce 
international legal compliance through repeated interactions 
with wayward states, transnational legal process theory plainly 
adopts constructivist elements.  For transnational legal process 
theory, as for constructivism, state identity and interests are 
not a rational result of an anarchic international structure, but 
are the result of a process of interaction between state and non-
state actors that endows states with subjective identities and 
interests.82  In other words, “constructivists believe that the 
                                                          
79 Id. 
80 E.g., Nicholas Onuf, Do Rules Say What They Do? From Ordinary 
Language to International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 385, 402 (1985) (using 
speech act theory to create a typology of all social rules).  I am not the first to 
use speech acts to further an understanding of international law but, to my 
knowledge, I am the first to use speech acts to explain transnational legal 
process.  
81 See Koh, New Haven, supra note 2, at 570 (“The idea of normativity 
connects the Transnational Legal Process School to the ‘Constructivist’ School 
of international relations.”). 
82 Id.; see Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The 
Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 395 (1992). 
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interests of states are created—at least in part—through 
interaction and can change through interaction.”83  The same is 
true for securitization theory, which is the “strongest off-shoot” 
of constructivism’s contribution to security studies.84  
Securitization theory has taken an additional step in 
constructivist thought, reasoning that if agents induce 
structural change, then the language of those agents should be 
examined through linguistic theory, specifically, speech acts.85  
Transnational legal process theory could also benefit from 
taking that additional step by building on its constructivist 
roots and examining the language of the agents of 
internalization.  Securitization theory and its critics, like 
Balzacq, are a natural starting point for such an examination 
because of their extensive use of linguistic theory.   
In his seminal work, How to Do Things with Words, Austin 
wrestled with the classical distinction between constatives and 
performatives.  A constative is an utterance which is about the 
truth or falsity of what it describes or reports (i.e. a 
statement).86  A performative is an utterance that performs an 
action.87 Austin’s inability to maintain a meaningful distinction 
between constatives and performatives led to his articulation of 
speech act theory.88 
Austin distinguishes between three types of speech acts: 
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary.   By uttering this 
very sentence I am doing something; I am in a sense 
performing an act.89 This is a locutionary act.90 An 
illocutionary act is an utterance “such as informing, ordering, 
                                                          
83 David Bederman, Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in 
International Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 469, 477 (2001) (quoting ANTHONY CLARK 
AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 128 (1999)). 
84 Thierry Balzacq, Constructivism and Securitization Studies, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SECURITY STUDIES 56 (Myriam Dunn Cavelty & 
Victor Mauer eds., 2011). 
85 See id. (“Securitization theory argues that language is not only 
concerned with what is ‘out there’ . . . but is also constitutive of that very 
social reality[, as] . . . securitization is ‘constructivist all the way down.’”).  
86 J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 1 (2d ed. 1989). 
87 Id. at 5–7. 
88 John R. Searle, Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts, 77 PHIL. 
REV. 405, 405 (1968). 
89 AUSTIN, supra note 87, at 94. 
90 Id at 101. 
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warning, undertaking . . . i.e., utterances that have a certain 
(conventional) force.”91  The utterance: “I do,” in a marriage 
ceremony is an illocutionary act because it is the “performance 
of an act in saying something.”92  Finally, a perlocutionary act 
is “what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such 
as convincing, persuading, deterring, even, say, surprising or 
misleading.”93  If the norm of universal jurisdiction is fully 
internalized in Senegal and Habré is eventually tried for his 
alleged crimes, this will be the perlocutionary act performed by 
the utterance: “Habré should be fairly tried.”  Habermas sums 
up speech act theory nicely: 
Through locutionary acts the speaker expresses states of affairs; 
he says something.  Through illocutionary acts the speaker 
performs an action in saying something.  The illocutionary role 
establishes the mode of the sentence . . . employed as a . . . 
promise, command, avowal, or the like . . . . Finally, through 
perlocutionary acts the speaker produces an effect upon the 
hearer.  By carrying out a speech act he brings about something 
in the world.  Thus the three acts that Austin distinguishes can 
be characterized in the following catchphrases: to say something, 
to act in saying something, to bring about something through 
acting in saying something.94   
Each one of these acts (locutionary, illocutionary, and 
perlocutionary) are the total speech act.95  Thus, the Agents 
want to move immediately beyond the locutionary act of 
uttering: “Habré should be fairly tried,” and trek to the 
perlocutionary act of prosecution.  The sought after result, or 
perlocutionary act, is obedience by transforming the utterance: 
“Habré should be fairly tried,” into a fair trial for Habré. 
The Copenhagen School’s (the “CS”) securitization theory 
seizes on Austin’s notion of an illocutionary act to explain how 
a policy issue is elevated from normal politics to a matter of 
national or international security. The CS explains 
                                                          
91 Id. at 109. 
92 Id. at 99. 
93 Id. at 109. 
94 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 288–89 
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984), quoted in Onuf, supra note 80, at 397–98 
(emphasis in original). 
95 Thierry Balzacq, The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, 
Audience and Context, 11 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 171, 175 (2005). 
17
  
2012]                      HUNTING A DICTATOR 207 
securitization as an illocutionary act:  
The process of securitization is what in language theory is called 
a speech act.  It is not interesting as a sign referring to 
something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act.  By 
saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a 
promise, naming a ship).96   
When a securitizing actor utters “security” in relation to a 
referent object (the thing that is threatened) to an audience, 
the securitizing actor is acting in saying something.97  For CS, 
uttering “security” is the same as uttering: “I promise.”  By 
saying it, the situation changes, the political becomes a matter 
of national or international security.98  The CS thus assumes 
that “the enunciation of security itself creates a new social 
order wherein ‘normal politics’ is bracketed.”99   
One could view the efforts to prosecute Habré in this light.  
By uttering: “Habré should be fairly tried,” to the Senegalese 
audience, his stay in Senegal becomes an issue of international 
concern, implicating universal jurisdiction and the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute within the Torture Convention.  
However, this view is unsatisfying. Habré has not been 
prosecuted, and it has proven an arduous process to convince 
Senegalese that universal jurisdiction and the Torture 
Convention’s obligation to extradite or prosecute should apply 
to him.  In the Habré case, the situation clearly did not change 
simply by uttering: “Habré should be fairly tried.”  It thus 
appears the efforts at internalization in the Habré case cannot 
be understood as an illocutionary act, such as: “I promise.”  
Securitization theory, so understood, is unhelpful in furthering 
an explanation of internalization. 
The CS is unhelpful in understanding internalization 
because it ignores the perlocutionary act and thus contextual 
factors. The CS maintains that securitization is a self-
referential practice “because it is in this practice [, the 
illocutionary act,] that the issue becomes a security issue—not 
necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because 
                                                          
96 BARRY BUZAN, OLE WAEVER & JAAP DE WILDE, SECURITY: A NEW 
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 26 (1998). 
97 Id. 
98 See id.  
99 Balzacq, supra note 95, at 171. 
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the issue is presented as such a threat.”100  Yet, the CS is quite 
clear that merely uttering security is insufficient: “[a] discourse 
that takes the form of presenting something as an existential 
threat to a referent object does not by itself create 
securitization . . . but the issue is securitized only if and when 
the audience accepts it as such.”101  On the one hand, the CS 
includes the contextual factors of the securitizing agent and the 
audience into its theory, but on the other, it implicitly 
dismisses the relevance of context by suggesting only the 
linguistic rules governing an illocutionary act are relevant in 
determining a successful securitization.102  In short, either 
securitization is self-referential, looking to the utterance per se, 
or intersubjective, looking outside the utterance to the 
securitizing agent and the audience.103   
Balzacq opts for the intersubjective view because of the 
importance of the perlocutionary act.104  The goal of 
securitization is “to prompt a significant response from the 
other;”105 this response can only be achieved through the 
perlocutionary act.106 As Balzacq puts it, “to study 
securitization is to unravel the process by which a securitizing 
actor induces an audience to agree with a given interpretation 
of an event or a set of events.”107  This quotation can be refitted 
to apply to a study of internalization in transnational legal 
process. Recall that complete persuasion is full 
internalization—getting the target country to agree to a norm 
such that it becomes part of its internal value set.  Examining 
internalization in the Habré case necessitates an under-
standing of the process by which the Agents induce the 
Senegalese audience to agree that Habré should be fairly tried 
and prosecute him accordingly.  In the Habré case, success 
comes with the application of universal jurisdiction and the 
Torture Convention to prosecute. Amendments to the 
Constitution and Penal Code permitting Habré to be lawfully 
                                                          
100 BUZAN ET AL., supra note 96, at 24. 
101 Id. at 25. 
102 See Balzacq, supra note 95, at 177–78. 
103Id. at 177. 
104 Id. at 177–78. 
105 Id. at 175. 
106 Id. at 175–76. 
107 Id. at 187. 
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prosecuted in Senegal are insufficient.    
Once the primacy of the perlocutionary act is accepted, one 
should consider factors of agency, audience, and context.108  
This is because the perlocutionary act is context dependent; it 
is “specific to the circumstances of issuance, and is therefore 
not conventionally achieved just by uttering particular 
utterances, and includes all those effects, intended or 
unintended, often indeterminate, that some particular 
utterances in a particular situation may cause.”109  The 
perlocutionary act is concerned with this securitizing agent’s 
ability to convince this audience, in this context, that the issue 
should be securitized.  Securitization, as with internalization, 
can still be understood through speech act theory, but it must 
focus on the perlocutionary act.  This reorientation allows an 
analysis of agency (I am excluding context and audience from 
my analysis)110 to aid in understanding Balzacq, securitization, 
and, for us, the internalization phase of transnational legal 
process. 
Balzacq’s discussion of agency’s impact on securitization is 
intricate and need not be reproduced in full here.  Suffice it to 
say what he means by agency is the ability of the securitizing 
agent to use discourse to produce agreement among the 
audience that an issue should be securitized.  Agency, thus, 
“involves the capacity of the securitizing actor to use 
appropriate words and cogent frames of reference in a given 
                                                          
108 Id. at 175–76. 
109 AUSTIN, supra note 87, at 14–15. 
110 Id. at 192. To understand the role of the audience, Balzacq argues 
three factors must be examined: (1) the “audience’s frame of reference,” (2) 
“its readiness to be convinced, which depends on whether it perceives the 
securitizing actor as knowing the issue and as trustworthy,” and (3) “its 
ability to grant or deny a formal mandate to public officials.” Id. An 
examination of context “concerns contextual effects on the audience’s 
responsiveness to the securitizing actor’s arguments—relevant aspects of the 
Zeitgeist that influence the listener, and the impact of the immediate 
situation on the way the securitizing author’s sentences are interpreted by 
the listener.” Id. at 182. Put simply, when securitization is attempted it 
causes the audience to look around to see if the situation requires 
securitization of the issue. Id. at 182–83. Balzacq illustrates the point with 
the Popish Plot of 1678.  Protestants were more responsive to efforts to 
securitize the Catholic threat because of the widely held belief among 
Protestants that Catholics were responsible for the Great Fire of London in 
1666, the perceived economic threat from France’s King Louis XIV, and the 
prospect that the King’s Catholic brother may succeed him. Id. at 183. 
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context, in order to win the support of the target audience for 
political purposes.”111  Put simply, agency is the power of words 
to produce a result.112  Applied to internalization in the Habré 
case, the Agents are those who attempt to use words to 
persuade their target audience, the Senegalese public and 
elites, to agree that Habré should be fairly tried and 
prosecuted.  Concluding the discussion here would not address 
the problem of inadequately explaining why internalization 
occurs because the notion of agency, in the form of agents of 
internalization, is already incorporated into transnational legal 
process theory’s explanation. 
For our purposes, the importance of Balzacq’s work is the 
factors that he argues influence agency.  These factors are: (1) 
the validity of the claim itself, (2) linguistic competence, and (3) 
the discursive strategy employed.113  Concerning the validity of 
the claim, in order for any claim uttered by an agent (in our 
case the Agents) to be accepted by the audience (in our case the 
Senegalese) and subsequently internalized, it must have a 
sufficient level of validity per se.  This statement is a rather 
pedestrian yet important point, for “the determination of 
evidence for truth claims does not only derive from the 
authority of the speaker, but emerges also out of the claim 
itself.”114  The claim cannot be that Habré should be fairly tried 
for a host of crimes with no logical or legally valid connection to 
him, such as the attempt to assassinate U.S. President Reagan 
in March 1981.  Such a ludicrous claim is clearly invalid and 
would rightly not produce the desired perlocutionary act.  The 
claim that Habré should be fairly tried for torture and other 
international crimes allegedly committed during his 
presidency, however, appears to be sufficiently valid per se.  
Therefore, the issue is with the Agents’ linguistic competence 
and discursive strategies. 
Linguistic competence comprises the idea of “who is 
allowed to speak about a subject matter or who can partake in 
the debate.”115  Only some individuals have sufficient linguistic 
                                                          
111 Id. at 192. 
112 See id. at 190. 
113 Id. at 190–91. 
114 Id. at 191. 
115 Id. at 190. 
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competence and are, therefore, influential with respect to a 
given issue because of their political and cultural capital, 
privileged access to the media, or the trust they command from 
the target audience.116  Cultural capital is defined as know-
ledge of the audience and the cultural context in which that 
audience is situated (e.g., the reverence for Senegalese 
religious leaders).117  Political capital means the position of 
power held by the actor vis-à-vis the audience and the issue.118  
Balzacq does not offer a definition of trust, but we may borrow 
from Rathburn, for whom trust is “the belief that one’s 
interests will not be harmed when placed within the hands of 
another.”119  When the Agents argue for Habré’s prosecution, 
they are in essence asking Senegalese to place Senegal’s 
interests in their hands.  The trust dynamics upon which I 
focus are between the Senegalese and the Agents and the 
Senegalese and the Counter-Agents—those individuals or 
groups opposing internalization in the Habré case and, thus, 
his prosecution.  Moreover, in my view, because linguistic 
competence is a function of “the power position of the agent,”120 
then, like the Agent’s power position, it is fluid rather than 
fixed.  Both the Agents and the Counter-Agents have 
attempted to erode each other’s power positions and, therefore, 
each other’s linguistic competence.   
Finally, the discursive strategy, or “the manner in which 
the securitizing actor makes the case for the point at stake,” 
can also impact words’ agency.121  Discursive strategies are 
based on logical rigor, emotional intensity, or some combination 
thereof.122  Cut-to-the-bone, linguistic competence, the validity 
of the claim, and discursive strategies explain the 
perlocutionary act as a consequence of, respectively, who 
speaks, what he says, and how he says it. 
 As we will see, the problem with internalization in the 
Habré case is that the Agents have struggled to secure the 
                                                          
116 Balzacq, supra note 95, at 191. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Brian C. Rathbun, It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and 
the International Relations Paradigm, 1 INT’L THEORY 345, 346 (2009). 
120 Balzacq, supra note 95, at 190. 




212 PACE INT’L LAW REV. [Vol. XXIV:1 
levels of capital and trust necessary to possess the linguistic 
competence that will bring about the perlocutionary act: 
agreement that Habré should be fairly tried and his resultant 
prosecution.  The Agents are not the only actors with putative 
linguistic competence to speak on whether Habré should be 
prosecuted.  There are many competing voices in the cacophony 
and some of these voices opposing Habré’s prosecution 
command high levels of cultural and political capital as well as 
trust.  It is these actors that the Agents must contend with in 
order to secure the linguistic competence to produce full norm 
internalization.   
Thus, building on Balzacq’s critique of securitization 
theory to examine the Habré case, we can begin to provide a 
more accurate answer to the question of why internalization 
occurs.  Yet, before moving to this task, I shall demonstrate 
that the Habré case is indeed an example of transnational legal 
process. 
IV. THE HABRÉ CASE AS A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 
Recall that a transnational legal process has four 
characteristics: it is (1) nontraditional (a hybrid of 
international and national), (2) non-statist (non-state actors 
play instrumental roles), (3) dynamic (moving from national 
and international venues), and (4) normative (law-creation and 
compliance with that law are its aims).123 These four 
characteristics are visible in three distinct phases: interaction, 
interpretation, and internalization.124 The following description 
of the Habré case will largely concentrate on interaction and 
interpretation, while Part V will provide a more detailed 
account of the internalization phase.  If the Habré case exhibits 
the above four characteristics and three phases, then we may 
reasonably conclude it is an example of transnational legal 
process at work. 
The first interaction between the Agents and Senegal 
occurred with the filing of a criminal complaint against Habré 
in a Dakar court in January 2000 on behalf of some of his 
victims with the help of both international and domestic 
                                                          
123 Koh, Process, supra note 6, at 184.  
124 Koh, September, supra note 9, at 339. 
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NGOs.125  This complaint sought to interpret the Torture 
Convention and customary law concerning universal 
jurisdiction so as to require Habré’s prosecution for the 
following alleged crimes: 97 extra-judicial killings, 142 cases of 
torture, 100 disappearances, and 736 arbitrary arrests.126  
Initially, the relevant governmental actor concurred with the 
Agents.  Habré was indicted by Judge Demba Kandji for 
torture and an investigation was opened for crimes against 
humanity, disappearances, and barbarous acts.127  The issue 
then became one of internalization, a phase in the process that 
has been fiercely contested by Habré and other Counter-
Agents.  After acceptance of the complaint by Judge Kandji, 
Habré retaliated by reportedly spending enormous sums of 
money to convert a once pro-prosecution Senegalese press into 
a pro-Habré one.128 
The contested internalization phase continued with the 
contretemps of Abdoulaye Wade’s election as President in 
February 2000.  Immediately, the Executive began to interfere 
in the prosecution.129  Madické Niang, Habré’s lawyer, was 
appointed special advisor to the President.  The Senegalese bar 
protested this conflict of interest and Wade responded by 
altering Niang’s title to consultant.130  Indeed, Niang’s conflict 
                                                          
125 Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisd-
iction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059 (2004). 
126 Reed Brody, Using Universal Jurisdiction to Combat Impunity, in 
JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 374, 383 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe 
Sands eds., 2003); COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE NATIONALE [NAT’L COMM’N OF 
INQUIRY], LES CRIMES ET DETOURNEMENTS DE L’EX-PRÉSIDENT HABRÉ ET DE SES 
COMPLICES [CRIMES AND ABUSES OF THE EX-PRESIDENT HABRÉ AND HIS 
ACCOMPLICES] 97–99 (1993) (documenting Habré’s crimes); see also ÉSAÏE 
TOÏNGAR, A MEMOIRE OF SURVIVAL, 1982–1986: A TEENAGER IN THE CHAD CIVIL 
WAR 16 (2006) (providing an eye-witness account of life in southern Chad in 
the early years of Habré’s rule, as follows: “Most of his rebels . . . were quick 
to kill people.  The only language they knew was Gourane, which was spoken 
by few people in Chad . . . if you answered them in French or Sara (the major 
dialect of the South), you would be tortured or killed.”). 
127 Reed Brody & Helen Duffy, Prosecuting Torture Universally: Hissène 
Habré, Africa’s Pinochet?, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF 
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 823 (Horst 
Fischer et al. eds., 2001). 
128 Dustin N. Sharp, Prosecutions, Development, and Justice: The Trial of 
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of interest later worsened, as he was named Senegal’s Minister 
of Justice, an important position for organizing the Habré trial, 
on April 14, 2008.131   
After this reshuffling, Senegal rejected the interpretation 
of the Torture Convention and universal jurisdiction offered by 
the Agents.  In July 2000, the Dakar Court of Appeals reversed 
Judge Kandji and dismissed the indictment against Habré.132  
Four days before the dismissal, on June 30, 2001, the Superior 
Council of the Magistracy, presided over by President Wade 
and the Minister of Justice, decided to transfer Judge Kandji 
from Chief Investigating Judge of the Dakar Regional Court to 
Assistant State Prosecutor at the Dakar Court of Appeals.133  
In the same meeting, it was agreed that the President of the 
Indicting Chamber, Cheikh Tidiane Diakhaté, before whom 
Habré’s appeal was pending, would be promoted to the Council 
of State.134  The battle to internalize the Agents’ interpretation 
of the Torture Convention and universal jurisdiction was being 
lost.  On March 20, 2001, the Court of Cassation upheld the 
Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the indictment.135  At this point, 
the efforts to prosecute Habré became not only non-statist and 
normative, but dynamic and nontraditional.   
A hegira to Belgian courts followed the dismissal of the 
complaint in Senegal.  In November 2000, some victims filed a 
criminal complaint in Belgian courts under its broad universal 
jurisdiction law.136  In September 2005, after a four-year 
                                                          
131 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Chronology of the Habré Case 
(Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Chronology]; Press Release, Senegal’s Foreign 
Minister Steps Down, AFP (Oct. 2, 2009) (stating that Niang left the Ministry 
of Justice in October 2009).  
132 Tanaz Moghadam, Note, Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons 
from Hybrid Tribunals Applied To the Case of Hissène Habré, 39 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 471, 500 (2008). 
133 Brody & Duffy, supra note 127, at 824. 
134 Id. The Council of State has jurisdiction, inter alia, over election 
disputes and auditing of the government finances. 
135 Stephen P. Marks, The Hissène Habré Case: The Law and Politics of 
Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND 
THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 
(Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). 
136 See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 892 (2003) (discussing in detail the political and legal 
issues surrounding Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law). 
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investigation involving a fact-gathering expedition to Chad,137 
Belgian Judge Daniel Fransen charged Habré with genocide, 
crimes against humanity, torture, and war crimes, issuing an 
international warrant for his arrest.138  In interacting with 
Belgian governmental actors, the Agents were able to 
successfully advocate for their interpretation of the Torture 
Convention and universal jurisdiction.   
As further evidence of its dynamism and nontraditional 
nature, the case moved back to Senegal, where the Dakar 
Court of Appeals ruled that, as a former head of state, Habré 
enjoyed “immunity of jurisdiction.”139  President Wade then 
formally entered the fray by announcing that Habré had one 
month to leave Senegal.140  This proclamation triggered 
protests by the then UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Mary Robinson, and the then UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan, both of whom requested that Wade prevent Habré 
from leaving Senegal.141 Meanwhile, the Agents sought another 
favorable international forum, the CAT, to pressure Senegal to 
adopt its interpretation of the Torture Convention.142  In May 
2006, the CAT ruled Senegal was obligated under the Torture 
Convention to prosecute or extradite Habré for his alleged acts 
of torture.143 
Wade then appealed to the African Union (“AU”) for a 
resolution of the issue.144  The AU created a Committee of 
                                                          
137 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Belgian Judge Visits Chad to 
Probe Crimes of Ex-Dictator Hissène Habré (Feb. 26, 2002). 
138 Moghadam, supra note 132, at 504. 
139 Id.; Chronology, supra note 131 (stating that on November 25, “the 
Indicting Chamber of the Court of Appeals of Dakar rules that it had no 
jurisdiction to rule on the extradition request); Press Release, Human Rights 
Watch, L’avis de la Cour d’Appel de Dakar sur la Demande d’Extradition de 
Hissène Habré (Extraits) [Opinion of the Dakar Court of Appeals on the 
Request for the Extradition of Hissène Habré (Extract)] (Nov. 25, 2011). 
140 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Chad: The Victims of Hissène 
Habré Still Awaiting Justice (July 11, 2005). 
141 Id. 
142 Decisions of the Committee Against Torture under Article 22 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Commc’n No. 181/2001, CAT/C/36/D/181/2001, ¶¶ 
9.6–9.9 (May 19, 2006). 
143 Id. 
144 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Les Crimes de l’Ancien 
Dictateur Tchadien Entre les Mains de l’Union Africaine [The Crimes of the 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6
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Eminent African Jurists mandated to determine the best 
available means for trying Habré.145  After reviewing the report 
of the Committee, the AU issued its decision on July 2, 2006, 
which “[m]andate[d] the Republic of Senegal to prosecute and 
ensure that Hissène Habré is tried, on behalf of Africa.”146  
Wade agreed to comply with the AU’s decision.147   
After Wade’s public agreement to try Habré, legal 
internalization proceeded.  In February 2007, the Senagalese 
Code of Criminal Procedure was amended, permitting 
Senegalese courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, torture, and genocide.148  In 
addition, the Senegalese Constitution was amended in July 
2008 to permit Senegalese courts to exercise jurisdiction over 
acts that, “when they were committed, were criminal according 
to the rules of international law relating to genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.”149  Yet, Senegal has 
steadfastly refused to proceed with the Habré trial until 
financial support is forthcoming from the international 
community.150  It thus appears that political and social 
internalization remains incomplete, and the proposed “fourth” 
phase of transnational legal process, obedience, has not 
occurred. 
Nevertheless, the Agents continue to use national and 
international fora to interact with Senegal in order to induce 
                                                                                                                                  
Ex-Chadian Dictator Are in the Hands of the African Union] (Nov. 27, 2005). 
145 Decision on the Hissene Habre Case and the African Union, 
Assem./AU/Dec.103 (VI), Doc.Assem./AU/8 (VI) Add.9 (Jan. 23-24, 2006). 
146 Decision on the Hissene Habre Case and the African Union, Assem./ 
AU/Dec.127(VII), Doc. Assem./AU/3 (VII) (Aug. 2, 2006). 
147 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, African Union: Senegal Agrees 
to Try Hissène Habré (July 2, 2006). 
148 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Senegal: EU Parliament Calls 
for Support of Hissène Habré Trial (Apr. 26, 2007). 
149 2008 CONST. art. 9; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Senegal: 
Government Amends Constitution to Pave Way for Hissène Habré Trial (July 
23, 2008). 
150 Request for Indication of Provisional Measures Submitted by the 
Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, Questions Relating to the Obligation 
to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), 2009 I.C.J.  (Feb. 17) (noting 
President Wade’s statement that if the international community does not 
provide financial support for the Habré trial, he will revoke Habré’s house 
arrest); Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Senegal Failing to Act on Trial 
of Hissène Habré (June 28, 2007). 
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Senegal to comply with the Torture Convention and prosecute 
Habré.  Availing themselves of the change in Senegalese law, 
on September 16, 2008, fourteen Chadian victims filed criminal 
complaints in a Dakar court alleging that Habré is criminally 
responsible for torture and crimes against humanity.151  In 
addition, Belgium filed an application with the ICJ seeking a 
ruling that Senegal must either prosecute Habré or extradite 
him to Belgium.152  Finally, Habré’s lawyers filed a petition 
with the Community Court of Justice of the Economic 
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”), which 
requests the court “to stop all [Senegalese] prosecutions and/or 
actions against Mr. Hissène Habré.”153  On November 18, 2010, 
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice ruled that Habré 
must be tried by an ad hoc international court.154  In 
furtherance of this ruling, the African Union and Senegal 
recently agreed to establish an international court for the 
specific purpose of trying Habré.155 
Based on the foregoing, transnational legal process is an 
apt theory for analyzing the Habré case. The initial 
interactions with Senegalese governmental actors resulted in a 
rejection of an interpretation of the Torture Convention and 
universal jurisdiction that would require Habré’s prosecution.  
                                                          
151 Chronology, supra note 131. 
152 Application Instituting Proceedings, Questions Relating to the 
Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.) 2009 I.C.J. 1, 15 (Feb. 16). 
153 Decision of The Court of Justice of the Economic Community of States 
of West Africa (Hissein Habré v. Republic of Senegal), No. ECW/CCJ/ 
JUD/06/10 ¶ 1 (Nov. 18, 2010).   
154 Id. (“[T]he mandate received by [Senegal] from the African Union 
confers upon it a mission of conceiving and suggesting all proper modalities 
to prosecute and judge strictly within the scope of an ad hoc special procedure 
of an international character as is practiced in international law by all 
civilized nations.”). This ruling has been criticized as mischaracterizing and 
misquoting the African Union’s decision, which called for Habré to be tried in 
a competent “Senegalese” venue. In referencing the AU’s decision the court 
dropped the word “Senegalese,” which allows the Court to claim that its 
decision for trial before an international court is consistent with the AU’s 
decision. E-mail from Reedy Brody, Counsel & Spokesperson, Human Rights 
Watch, to Caleb J. Stevens, Carter Ctr. Liberia Law Fellow, Rep. of Liber. 
Land Comm’n (Nov. 24, 2010, 10:05 PM). 
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This rejection forced the Agents to search for other 
international and national fora that could trigger interactions 
with Senegal, namely, to engage in transnational public law 
litigation.   
Thus, the normativity of the campaign to fairly try Habré 
has been non-traditional (i.e. neither entirely national nor 
international) and dynamic (consisting of almost tempestuous 
movements from international to national fora).  Those fora 
have consisted of Belgian courts, the CAT, the AU, the 
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, and the ICJ, as well as 
informal talks with prominent members of the international 
community. These repeated interactions with Senegal in 
multiple fora resulted in the successful legal internalization of 
the interpretation proffered by the Agents.  Moreover, the 
Agents prodded the government to utilize several methods of 
legal internalization: judicial interpretation, executive action, 
and legislation.  What remains incomplete, however, are the 
efforts to induce obedience through social and political 
internalization—i.e., the fair trial of Hissène Habré. 
V. THE INTERNALIZATION PROBLEM IN THE HABRÉ CASE AS A 
PROBLEM OF AGENCY 
This section will draw on interviews and media reports to 
support my argument that the three factors of agency (claim’s 
validity, linguistic competence, and discursive strategies) can 
partially explain the inability to induce social and political 
internalization in the Habré case and, thus, obedience (i.e., the 
perlocutionary act).  As noted in Part III, the validity of the 
claim: “Habré should be fairly tried,” is not really an obstacle.  
The allegations and legal arguments leveled against him 
appear to warrant a fair trial.156  Indeed, the amendment to the 
                                                          
156 The legal proceedings served as a testing ground for the validity of the 
Agents’ claim that Habré should be fairly tried. The Court of Cassation 
asserted three premises requiring the dismissal of the indictment against 
Habré: (1) the Torture Convention is not self-executing and, thus, Senegalese 
Constitution Article 98 providing that international law is superior to 
statutory law “does not apply,” (2) the Torture Convention requires 
implementing legislation to satisfy Article 4’s “jurisdiction to prescribe” and 
Article 5’s “jurisdiction to adjudicate,” and (3) although legislation was 
passed implementing the “jurisdiction to prescribe” under Article 4, there has 
been no legislation implementing Article 5’s “jurisdiction to adjudicate.” 
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Guengueng v. Habré, Ct. of Cassation (Mar. 20, 2001). Article 5 of the 
Torture Convention provides, in relevant part, “[e]ach State Party shall take 
such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences referred to in article 4,” i.e. torture, attempted torture, complicity to 
commit torture. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 5, opened for signature Feb. 4, 
1985, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  The Court of Cassation interpreted Article 4 as 
requiring State Parties to exercise “jurisdiction to prescribe” (i.e. to make 
torture criminal) and Article 5 as requiring State Parties to exercise 
“jurisdiction to adjudicate” (i.e. to vest courts with universal jurisdiction over 
torture).  Guengueng v. Habré, Ct. of Cassation (Mar. 20, 2001). On August 
28, 1996 Senegal added Article 295-1 to the Penal Code, which makes torture 
a criminal offense.  CODE PÉNAL art. 295-1. The Court of Cassation agreed 
with the Court of Appeals that this amendment satisfied Article 4’s 
jurisdiction to prescribe. Guengueng v. Habré, Ct. of Cassation (Mar. 20, 
2001). The problem, according to both the Court of Appeals and the Court of 
Cassation, lay with Article 5’s jurisdiction to adjudicate.  Id. Absent 
legislation granting Senegalese courts universal jurisdiction over torture 
pursuant to the Torture Convention, Habré could not be prosecuted for 
alleged torture committed outside Senegal. Id. The opinion of the Court of 
Cassation has been criticized on at least three grounds.  First, Constitution 
Article 98 provides that treaties are superior to domestic law and Senegal is a 
monist legal system that grants treaties direct effect. 2008 CONST. art. 98 
(“Treaties . . . ratified or approved are, upon their publication, authority 
superior to other laws . . . . ”); see also Moghadam, supra note 132, at 501.  
Second, the distinction between “jurisdiction to adjudicate” and “jurisdiction 
to prescribe” in the Torture Convention is fundamentally flawed.  The 
distinction misconstrues the principle of legality.  The principle of legality is 
geared towards ensuring that a person is aware an act is criminalized in the 
legal system to which they are subject.  Brody & Duffy, supra note 127, at 
834.  This is not a jurisdictional issue and, thus, a failure to pass a domestic 
law vesting Senegalese courts with universal jurisdiction over torture does 
not implicate the principle of legality. Id. Indeed, the Court’s reasoning would 
permit a failure to pass implementing legislation under Article 5 as an excuse 
for Senegal’s non-compliance with Article 7’s requirement to extradite or 
prosecute. Id. at 835. This is contrary to the international legal principle that 
domestic law cannot excuse a state’s non-compliance with its international 
obligations. Id. at 835–36. Third, there is support for the proposition that 
customary international law requires Senegal to either extradite or prosecute 
Habré for the acts of torture he allegedly committed. Id. at 837; see also 
Regina v. Bartle (Pinochet III), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 276 (U.K.) (separate 
opinion of Lord Millet). Article 7’s requirement to extradite or prosecute 
reflects customary international law and thus does not depend on 
implementing legislation for legal effect. Brody & Duffy, supra note 127, at 
835. The Court of Cassation, however, did not address the issue of customary 
international law.  Guengueng v. Habré, Ct. of Cassation (Mar. 20, 2001). 
Moreover, the CAT found that Senegal has failed to fulfill its obligations 
under the Torture Convention by refusing to either prosecute Habré for the 
acts of torture alleged in the initial 2000 complaint or demonstrate 
insufficient evidence to prosecute. Decisions of the Committee Against 
Torture under Article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Commc’n No. 181/2001, 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6
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Senegalese Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure 
demonstrate as much.  Consequently, I will focus my analysis 
on linguistic competence and discursive strategies. 
A.  Linguistic Competence or Who Says It 
There are multiple actors in the Habré case who 
purportedly possess the linguistic competence to speak on the 
issue of whether Habré should be fairly tried in Senegal.  The 
Agents must contend with the Counter-Agents.  The most 
prominent of which are the marabouts and members of the 
Senegalese intelligentsia. 
The marabouts head Muslim Brotherhoods, which 
command enormous amounts of cultural and political capital 
and are widely trusted by the Senegalese.157  There are three 
Brotherhoods: Mouridiya (16% of Senegalese are members), 
Tijaniya (37% of Senegalese are members), and Qadiriya (3% of 
Senegalese are members).158 In 2000, 85.4% of Senegalese 
surveyed by Afrobarometer said they had confidence in the 
Brotherhoods, and they have traditionally “played a very 
significant role in politics, providing a critical alliance with and 
support for the ruling party and the government.”159  Indeed, 
the Parti Socialiste du Sénégal (“PS”) ascended as the 
dominant party because Leopold Senghor, the PS founder and 
first President of Senegal, cultivated a political alliance with 
the Brotherhoods, especially the Mouridiya Brotherhood.160   
The tradition of the Brotherhoods overtly participating in 
politics, however, is on the wane.  There has been a decline in 
the marabouts exhorting their followers to vote for a specific 
candidate.161  Nevertheless, the Brotherhoods are regarded as 
the guardians of religious and moral life for millions of 
                                                                                                                                  
CAT/C/36/D/181/ 2001, ¶¶ 9.6-9.9 (May 19, 2006). 
157 Richard Vengroff & Michael Magala, Democratic Reform, Transition, 
and Consolidation: Evidence from Senegal’s 2000 Presidential Election, 39 J. 
MOD. AFR. STUD. 129, 149 (2001). 
158 INST.FOR DEMOCRACY IN S. AFR. ET. AL, SUMMARY OF RESULTS: ROUND 4 
AFROBAROMETER SURVEY IN SENEGAL 77 (2008). 
159 Vengroff & Magala, supra note 157, at 149. 
160 Lucy Creevey et al., Party Politics and Different Paths to Democratic 
Transitions: A Comparison of Benin and Senegal, 11 PARTY POL. 471, 479–80 
(2005). 
161 Vengroff & Magala, supra note 157, at 149. 
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Senegalese.162  Moreover, the marabouts, and the Brotherhoods 
they head, still hold sway over many voters’ electoral 
decisions.163  In the 2000 Presidential elections the silence of 
many marabouts was interpreted by their supporters as 
opposition to the incumbent Abdou Diouf.164  Vengroff argues 
that the Brotherhoods’ “step-by-step disengagement from the 
PS has played a significant role in the democratic transition in 
Senegal.”165  The political power of the Brotherhoods, especially 
the Mouridiya, was highlighted by the fact that, upon election 
as President, Wade built his vacation home in Touba, the 
capital of the Mouridiya Brotherhood.166  Thus, the 
Brotherhoods are widely regarded as king-makers and trusted 
civil society organizations with extraordinary political and 
cultural capital.  
Habré has shrewdly strengthened the linguistic 
competence of the Tijaniya marabouts concerning the issue of 
his prosecution.  Habré is a member of the Tijaniya 
Brotherhood167 and married to a Senegalese woman from a 
prominent Tijaniya family, with whom he has had children.168  
Moreover, he is a follower of the recently deceased Tijaniya 
marabout, Thirno Mountaga Tall, a man lionized in Senegal for 
his resistance to French colonial rule.169  By aligning himself 
with Tall’s family,170 Habré secured allies commanding 
substantial political and cultural capital and trust in Senegal.  
Mr. Thirno’s son, Madani Tall, has expressed an obligation to 
                                                          
162 Momar Dieng, Crises Idrissa Seck et les chefs religieux portés 
disparus: Le silence des Mara [Crises Idrissa Seck and the religious leaders 
gone missing: The silence of Mara], LE QUOTIDIEN [THE DAILY] (Sept. 4, 2009), 
http://www.africatime.com/Senegal/nouvelle.asp?no_nouvelle=478443&no_cat
egorie=. 
163 Vengroff & Magala, supra note 157, at 149. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 150. 
166 Id. 
167 James Copnall, Moroccan Shrine Unites Africans, BBC (Feb. 18, 2009; 
9:11AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7885798.stm. 
168 Interview with Aboubacry Mbodj, Vice President, Rencontre Africaine 
pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme [African Assembly for the Defense of 
Human Rights] (Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Mbodj Interview]. 
169 Id. 
170 Cheikh Yérim Seck & Jean-Dominique Geslin, Habré devant ses 
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protect Habré.171   
The head of the Tijaniya Brotherhood, Serigne Mansour 
Sy, said he will oppose any attempt to extradite his 
“disciple.”172  Other members of the Tijaniya Brotherhood 
steadfastly refuse to support the prosecution of Habré 
regardless of his innocence or guilt.173 Senegalese 
overwhelmingly trust the Brotherhoods, thus if they assert 
Habré’s innocence and hypocritical bullying by the West, then 
many Senegalese accept these assertions.  Members of 
government are also unlikely to defy the Tijaniya Brotherhood 
because of their political influence. According to Alioune Tine, 
President of Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de 
l’Homme (“RADDHO”), the only reason Habré has not stood 
trial is because he is benefiting from the protection of the 
lobbies maraboutiques, or marabout lobby.174  Tine was quoted 
as saying, “Hissène Habré is well acquainted with the 
marabout families.  Upon arriving in Senegal, he was taken in 
by the religious leaders.”175  By closely aligning himself with 
the Tijaniya Brotherhood, Habré grants the Brotherhood 
expertise in matters concerning him, such as his prosecution. 
The linguistic competence of the marabouts is a significant 
challenge to the Agents. Human Rights Watch and other 
foreign NGOs command less political and cultural capital and 
trust than the marabouts.  The political and social capital and 
trust commanded by the Brotherhoods is nearly unassailable in 
Senegal, especially by a foreigner.176  The marabouts have 
allegedly used this capital and trust to influence the 
government in exchange for financial support from Habré.  
When a marabout was asked why his Brotherhood protects 
                                                          
171 Mbodj Interview, supra note 168.  Madani conceded to Rencontre 
Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme that if the allegations 
against Habré are true, then he should be tried. Id. The problem with that 
concession is self-evident: the only means to determine the truth of the 
allegations is a fair trial, which Madani will not support until the allegations 
are proven to be true. 
172 Seck & Geslin, supra note 170. 
173 Mbodj Interview, supra note 168. 
174 Daouda L. Gbaya, Le dossier Habré est bloqué par Wade [The Habré 
case is Blocked by Wade], LE QUOTIDIEN [THE DAILY], May 14, 2009. 
175 Id. 
176 Telephone Interview with Reed Brody, Counsel & Spokesperson, 
Human Rights Watch (May 22, 2009) [hereinafter May 22 Brody Interview]. 
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Habré, despite the crimes he committed against fellow Muslims 
in Chad, the marabout responded candidly, “What do you 
want?  He has been a strong financial supporter.”177   
During Wade’s bid for reelection in 2006, those familiar 
with the Habré case suspect the following quid pro quo was 
offered by at least one of the Brotherhoods: in exchange for our 
political support in the upcoming presidential election, do not 
extradite Habré.178  The Agents, such as Human Rights Watch 
and Senegalese NGOs, possess limited resources, precluding 
the possibility of a nation-wide grassroots campaign to erode 
some of the linguistic competence commanded by the 
marabouts.179 Moreover, even if the Agents possessed sufficient 
resources for such a grassroots campaign, it is highly unlikely 
that it would be able to appreciably undermine the protection 
granted to Habré by the Tijaniyas. 
Members of the intelligentsia (other than those who are 
Agents) take divergent positions, and, as well-educated 
Senegalese, members of the intelligentsia necessarily command 
a certain level of cultural and political capital and trust 
concerning the Habré case.  L’Association Sénégalaise pour les 
Nations-Unies (“ASNU”), takes a moderate position, declaring 
that Senegal should try Habré in accordance with the AU 
mandate and with full protection of the defendant’s rights.180  
ASNU, however, condemned all international pressure on 
Senegal.181  This criticism of international pressure is an 
implicit rebuke of the Agents.  Other members of the 
intelligentsia, especially Professor Oumar Sankharé of Cheikh 
Anta Diop University in Dakar, roundly and passionately 
condemn the efforts of the Agents to prosecute Habré.182   
The linguistic competence commanded by Habré himself 
                                                          
177 Interview with Source Familiar with the Case.  Because of the 




180 Mamadou Diallo, Jugement de Hissène Habré: L’Asnu contre toute 
pression sur le Sénégal [Judgment of Hissène Habré: ASNU Against all 
Pressure on Senegal], LE QUOTIDIEN [THE DAILY], Aug. 31, 2006. 
181 Id. 
182 E.g. Oumar Sankharé, Affaire Hissène Habré ou affaire Me Seye? 
[Hissène Habré Affair or Me Seye Affair?], ZOOM TCHAD, Oct. 12, 2008. 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6
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must also be considered.  Since the original complaint was filed 
in 2000, Habré has launched an aggressive media campaign.183  
Habré allegedly uses his wealth to influence the Senegalese 
media.184  As Reed Brody elliptically put it, “[i]n 2005, there 
were still significant parts of the press that appeared to 
respond to outside pressures more than fact.”185  Upon Habré’s 
initial arrest by Senegalese authorities in 2005 pursuant to 
Belgium’s arrest warrant, the Senegalese media possessed a 
noticeable tenor in Habré’s favor.186  As a result of his wealth, 
it appears Habré has secured privileged access to the 
Senegalese media and, thereby, bolstered his power to speak on 
the issue of his prosecution and, therefore, his linguistic 
competence. 
B.  Discursive Strategies or How They Say It: Logical Rigor and 
Emotional Intensity 
The Agents employ three discursive strategies: (1) 
highlight the venality of the marabouts protecting Habré, (2) 
focus on the Senegalese victims of Habré’s rule, and (3) 
emphasize that it is in Senegal’s interests as a member of the 
international community to prosecute Habré.  The first is a 
combination of logical rigor and emotional intensity; the 
second, is purely of emotional intensity; and the third is purely 
of logical rigor. 
The Agents have attempted to squelch the linguistic 
competence of the Tijaniya marabouts by pointing to the 
financial support Habré provides them.  RADDHO and Human 
Rights Watch allege the corruption of Habré’s Tijaniya 
protectors.  This allegation appears to be reasonable, given the 
shocking admission by one marabout mentioned above.187  
RADDHO and Human Rights Watch reportedly accused Habré 
of bribing the Tijaniya marabouts with approximately US 
                                                          
183 See supra Part IV. 
184 See supra Part IV. 
185 May 22 Brody Interview, supra note 176. 
186 Id. 
187 Mbodj contends that the loyalty of the “fanatics” protecting Habré is 
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$600,000.188  A political cartoon satirizes Habré’s use of the 
marabouts.  In the cartoon, Habré is piggybacking a marabout 
who uses a talisman to ward off a Belgian Judge and the 
skeletons of Habré’s victims at the same time that notes of the 
Senegalese currency, the CFA franc, fall from his pockets189 
and the marabout shouts that they should look for others.190 
In addition, the Agents launched a media campaign 
intending to show Senegalese that Habré committed crimes 
against their fellow citizens.  Reed Brody admits one of “the 
reasons that we lost in 2000 and 2001, was because we did not 
convince the Senegalese public that Hissène Habré is the 
criminal we say he is.”191  Brody estimates that, currently, 
about half the media coverage on the Habré case is pro-
prosecution, whereas, for years, the media coverage favored 
Habré.192  The limited resources of Human Rights Watch, 
RADDHO, and others have been utilized for a media campaign 
targeting the Senegalese political and intellectual class.193  
They even hired a media consultant to advise them on the most 
effective use of the media.194   
Some of the products of these efforts include a series of 
articles detailing the abuses committed by Habré’s regime 
against the Senegalese.  As early as January 2000 an article in 
a Senegalese paper appeared informing the Senegalese public 
that two of their fellow citizens were victims of Habré’s 
regime.195  The two victims were Demba Gaye and Abderamane 
                                                          
188 Human Rights Watch accuse Habré a soudoyé un chef réligieux 
sénégalais avec 300 millions [Human Rights Watch Accuses Habré of Having 
Bribed a Senegalese Leader with 300 million], L’OBSERVATEUR [THE 
OBSERVER], Oct. 26, 2005; Habré “achète” un religieux sénégalais à 350 
millions [Habré “Buys” a Senegalese Cleric with 350 Million], LE QUOTIDIEN 
[THE DAILY], Oct. 26, 2005. 
189 Pour sa protection Hissène Habré aurait remis plus de 300 millions de 
Fcfa à un chef religieux sénégalais [For his Protection Hissène Habré Would 
Have Given More Than 300 Million of CFA Francs to a Senegalese Religious 
Leader], LE MATIN [THE MORNING], Oct. 26, 2005. 
190 Id. 
191 May 22 Brody Interview, supra note 176. 
192 Id. 
193 Interview with Reed Brody, Counsel & Spokesperson, Human Rights 
Watch (May 20, 2009) [hereafter May 20 Brody Interview]. 
194 May 22 Brody Interview, supra note 176. 
195 Deux Sénégalais parmi les victims [Two Senegalese Among the 
Victims], WALF FADJRI, Jan. 26, 2000. 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/6
  
226 PACE INT’L LAW REV. [Vol. XXIV:1 
Gaye, arrested in Chad on August 23, 1987.196  A more recent 
article detailed the story of Abdou Rahmane Guèye.  Upon 
arriving in Chad, he was accused of espionage, had a 
substantial amount of money confiscated, was imprisoned, and 
then tortured.197  Gueye was only released after the then 
Senegalese President, Abdou Diouf, intervened on his behalf.198  
An October 2005 news article provided an account of two other 
Senegalese victims of Habré’s regime. One Senegalese victim, 
Clément Abaifouta, claims that he was imprisoned for alleged 
membership in the Zaghawa ethic group, which Habré was 
targeting at the time.199  This article was accompanied by an 
editorial declaring, “[i]t is time for Senegal to correct the error 
it committed in protecting Habré for 15 years.”200 
By focusing on Habré’s Senegalese victims as a discursive 
strategy, Human Rights Watch and other NGOs hope to 
overcome the foreign, or “other,” stigma that undermines their 
linguistic competence.201 Stories, like those above, are 
reiterated by RADDHO in order to reveal the propinquity 
between Habré’s crimes and Senegal such that Senegalese view 
them as committed against Senegalese and not just distant 
Chadians.202  The Senegalese victims of Habré’s rule serve as 
the “bridge” between the Agents and the Senegalese public, 
providing “the passion and the determination of the victim.”203 
Finally, the Agents host conferences in Dakar to argue 
that it is in Senegal’s interests to prosecute Habré.  One such 
conference, in May 2010, was organized by l’Association 
Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de 
l’Homme (“ATPDH”), in order to inform Senegalese and the 
international community of the latest developments in the 
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Habré case.204 The participants were local Muslim and 
Christian leaders, a member of parliament, a business owner, 
and a university professor.205  Jacqueline Moudeina, a Chadian 
lawyer for the victims and member of ATPDH, argued Senegal 
has an undeniable interest in combating impunity: “Our 
heartfelt plea is for a strong civil society that stands up against 
impunity in Africa.  It is not in a spirit of vengeance that we 
pursue this; we simply want to eradicate impunity.”206  The MP 
who attended the conference, Abdoulaye Babou, vowed to raise 
the Habré issue before the National Assembly.207  
Unfortunately, this vow has not produced a trial.   
There is evidence that the interest argument is gaining 
traction in Senegal.  One news article argued the repeated 
pressure by the international community is damaging 
Senegal’s reputation and foreign policy goals, that there is no 
legal reason to prevent Habré’s prosecution.208  However, the 
author of the editorial professed sympathy for the argument 
that Habré should not be prosecuted in the interests of 
sovereignty and pan-Africanism.209 
The discursive strategies employed by the Agents contend 
with fiery rhetoric from the Counter-Agents.  The Counter-
Agents use four distinct discursive strategies: (1) pan-African 
unity against Western injustice, (2) Western hypocrisy in 
harrying Habré while granting impunity to others, (3) the 
alleged Senegalese victims are lying, and (4) prosecuting Habré 
would be contrary to Senegalese traditional hospitality.   The 
first discursive strategy is steeped in an anti-colonial 
mentality.  Aside from a logical argument presented by Habré’s 
attorneys, that foreign aid for his trial would prejudice the 
proceedings against him,210 the Counter-Agents’ discursive 
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strategies are unabashedly emotional. 
One of the most prominent Counter-Agents is Oumar 
Sankharé.  He has written lengthy, almost sermonic, editorials 
condemning efforts to prosecute Habré.  One article described 
Habré as the “courageous former Chadian Head of State” and 
the Habré case as “having revealed to the entire world a 
monstrous image of a state where all the laws are violated, 
where all violations are legalized.”211  According to Sankharé, 
this latter characterization is imposed by “Whites” and 
Western powers who want to force Senegalese to separate 
themselves from their traditional valor, morals, and 
religions.212  The article continues by denouncing the West as 
hypocritical in seeking Habré’s prosecution when Europe, 
especially Belgium, has committed a myriad of crimes against 
Africa.213  The pan-African view is aptly captured in the 
following quotation, also from Sankharé, “Habré is precisely 
this hero and this African resistor who put an end to the 
imperialist visions of France . . . . ”214  The article contends that 
Senegal is succumbing to pressure from the West for euros and 
petro-dollars, and that Senegal should not aid the West in their 
attempts to imprison African presidents.215 
There appears to be no logical consistency between 
Soukharé’s discursive strategies.  In the same editorial in 
which he exhorts Senegalese to embrace a pan-African defense 
of Habré, he excoriates former Libyan President, Muammar al-
Gaddafi, and Chadian President, Idriss Déby, for their crimes 
during Habré’s rule.216  For example, in an open letter sent to 
Habré, Sankharé proclaims that Habré is a martyr for African 
resistance.217  The letter reads more like a manifesto of anti-
colonial African resistance, yet the letter condemns the use of 
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Gaddafi’s money in damaging Senegalese power.218  Sankharé 
apparently feels no compunction in calling for Africans to unite 
against the West in one sentence and, in another, attacking the 
West for ignoring the role played by Idriss Déby during Habré’s 
rule.219   
Other Counter-Agents use similar discursive strategies.  
One article concurs with Sankharé, arguing the hypocrisy of 
targeting Habré without also prosecuting his accomplices, the 
United States and Idriss Déby.220  Habré’s lawyers also try to 
deflect attention towards Gaddafi and Déby.  They claim the 
AU decision mandating that Senegal try Habré was rendered 
by a committee of pretend jurists and experts corrupted by 
Gaddafi.221  They assert the AU decision is merely part of an 
international plot against Habré, of which Idriss Déby is an 
architect.222 
The Counter-Agents also try to discredit the claim that 
Senegalese were victimized by Habré.223  One article authored 
by Sankharé alleges Abdou Rahmane Guèye was not a victim 
of Habré’s regime because he never set foot in Chad.224  The 
article goes on to repeat the refrain that Habré is an African 
hero and the campaign to prosecute him is another Western 
injustice against Africa.225 
The final discursive strategy comes from Habré’s 
attorneys, who argue prosecution would be contrary to 
traditional Senegalese hospitality.  The Wolof word teranga 
translates into English as “hospitality.”226  This discursive 
strategy relies on teranga when calling attention to the fact 
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that, since he arrived in Senegal, Habré has lived in peace as a 
good Muslim, married a Senegalese woman from a prominent 
Tijaniya family, had Senegalese children, and used his wealth 
to become an important supporter of local businesses.227  
Habré’s attorneys argue it would contradict teranga to 
prosecute him.228  
Several Senegalese whom I interviewed expressed the view 
that there is a lack of political will to try Habré.229  By 
analyzing the efforts to internalize universal jurisdiction and 
the obligation to extradite or prosecute under the Torture 
Convention according to the three factors of agency, the reason 
for this lack of political will becomes clearer.  The Agents, 
especially the foreign NGOs, must contend with the marabouts, 
who command higher levels of cultural and political capital as 
well as trust.  In addition, for most of the period since the 
original complaint was filed in 2000, Habré has enjoyed 
privileged access to the Senegalese media.  The advantageous 
linguistic competence of the marabouts is coupled with the 
Counter-Agents’ discursive strategies based on emotional 
intensity, which plays to the fears and prejudices of the 
Senegalese with apparent effectiveness.  Although I cannot say 
conclusively which has been the greater source of success for 
the Counter-Agents, linguistic competence or discursive 
strategy, it is telling that the Agents’ more logical discursive 
strategies have thus far been ineffective. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Approaching the internalization problem via speech act 
and securitization theories provides a useful analytical 
framework.  This framework can help explain why, after more 
than ten years, social and political internalization remains 
elusive in the Habré case.  There are multiple actors 
commanding linguistic competence on the issue who adamantly 
oppose Habré’s prosecution.  Moreover, the Agents’ discursive 
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strategies have been countered with other discursive strategies 
designed to persuade Senegalese that Habré should not be 
prosecuted.  Consequently, political and social internalization 
and, thus, the perlocutionary act (i.e. agreement to prosecute 
and prosecution) have not occurred. 
The foregoing analysis offers up a previously unexplored 
approach to transnational legal process’ internalization 
problem.  In connecting with speech act theory and Balzacq’s 
critique of securitization theory, I attempted to demonstrate 
that the question of why internalization occurs can be 
explained by focusing on the nano-process of agency.  Although 
this paper falls short of conclusively demonstrating the utility 
of agency in explaining internalization, it opens up some future 
lines of inquiry.  First, future work should provide an analysis 
of multiple case studies.  Second, my article deliberately 
excludes from its purview an analysis of audience and context, 
which Balzacq argues contribute to a successful securitization.   
My analysis of agency’s influence on internalization in the 
Habré case is intended only as a starting point.  The context in 
which Senegalese find themselves may give credence to the 
discursive strategies of the Counter-Agents.  The fact that the 
trial is sought in Senegal may render Senegalese responsive to 
discursive strategies of pan-Africanism, Western hypocrisy, 
and hospitality.  This is a bit of a tautology, but the point is the 
success or failure of discursive strategies (i.e., their ability to 
elicit supportive responses from the audience) is influenced by 
the context in which they are employed.  Senegal is a former 
French colony sensitive to French influence over its former 
colonies, of which Chad is one.  Some Senegalese criticize, for 
example, the decades-long presence of French troops in Senegal 
as evidence of French domination.230  The extent to which such 
contextual factors impact internalization should be 
investigated.   
In addition, the role of the audience should be examined.  
In order to understand the influence of the audience on 
internalization, one must discern the ability of the audience 
(e.g., Senegalese) “to grant or deny a formal mandate to public 
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officials.”231  Thus, in well-established democracies, the public 
and elites will be able to transmit their views on the issue to 
public officials.  In a nascent democracy, such as Senegal, this 
transmission may be corrupt.232  Indeed, we have seen evidence 
of corruption in the Habré case through Wade’s apparent 
interference with the judiciary.233  Keohane’s argument that 
regime type influences internalization could aid this analysis.
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